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The present paper investigates how buyer power, that is, the exercise of sig-
niﬁcant market power by retailers/wholesalers might impact international
markets and, in particular, how it may aﬀect the volume of international
trade, consumer prices and welfare. We are especially interested in deter-
mining how a reduction in trade costs aﬀects the contractual arrangements
between powerful retailers, and domestic and foreign suppliers, and what the
consequences are for market outcomes.
Our analysis is motivated by the following observations. First, in many
industries in which intermediaries play an important role concentration has
been rising and is today often higher at the distribution level than at the
manufacturing level. For instance, the ﬁve largest US grocery retailers in-
creased their market share from 26.5% in 1980 to 38% in 2000 (Oligopoly
Watch, 2003), and Wal-Mart is today the world’s biggest company by sales
(US$312.4 billion) and the number-one grocer in the US.1 Similarly, the 20
largest retailing ﬁrms in the EU account for 43% of aggregate retail food
turnover whereas the equivalent number for manufacturing is 14.5%.2 This
has led to signiﬁcant buyer power at the retail level. Evidence concerning
the exercise of such power ranges from various favorable terms obtained by
major retailers (slotting allowances, listing fees, up-front fees, payments for
special promotions, etc.; see Clarke et al., 2002) to refusal to purchase, prod-
uct de-listing, most favored customer clauses, and exclusive arrangements.3
1Note that in the US grocery business, buyer concentration is now much higher than
seller concentration despite the fact that concentration on the seller side has also risen. For
instance, twenty foodmakers (e.g. Philip Morris, Nestl˙ e) now account for 54% of checkout
sales, up from about 30% in the early 1970s (Copple, 2002).
2In 2006, the four largest retailers in the UK controlled 60% of the total UK grocery
sales (Competition Commission, 2007). See Dobson et al. (2001) for concentration ra-
tios for grocery retailing in European countries, and Gereﬃ (1999) concerning clothing
retailing.
3See Oligopoly Watch (2003), Clarke et al. (2002), and Konzelmann et al. (2007)
for speciﬁc examples. Among others, cases of exclusive arrangements have emerged in the
furniture industry concerning Chinese suppliers to US buyers (Sloan, 2006), and in the toy
1In 2000, the UK Competition Commission identiﬁed 42 buyer power practices
used by ﬁve large retailers. Thirty of these practices were deemed to be anti-
competitive and twenty-seven against the public interest (see Competition
Commission, 2000, Table 2.14).4
Second, even large suppliers today do most of their business with a few
powerful buyers. For example, there is evidence that large suppliers, such as
Black and Decker, Levi Strauss, Philips, and Sara Lee, have become more and
more dependent on powerful buyers, such as Wal-Mart, to the point even of
being compelled to move production abroad to satisfy these buyers’ require-
ments. Even for the newly merged Procter&Gamble (P&G) and Gillette, for
instance, with sales in excess of $68 billion a year, Wal-Mart is its number one
customer with total orders as big as P&G’s next nine customers combined.5
Similarly, a leading German brand producer reports that 75% of its sales are
going to only four retailers (Clarke et al., 2002). Using data from the US re-
tail yogurt market, which is dominated by two main manufacturers (Dannon
and General Mills), Villas-Boas (2007) ﬁnds evidence that is consistent with
strong bargaining power of retailers.
Third, powerful buyers have profound eﬀects on international markets. In
its regular assessment of price dispersion for goods and services inside the EU
market, the EU Commission observes that price dispersion across member
states is much more signiﬁcant for consumer goods than for industrial goods.
It further notes that this is due in large part to ‘the bargaining power and
eﬃciency of wholesale and retail distributors’ (European Commission, 2000).
In other words, the lack of consumer price convergence despite free trade and
industry with the case of Toys "R" Us inducing toy makers to cut oﬀ discounters (FTC,
1998).
4Although the preliminary report did ﬁnd that retailers engaged in the practice of re-
quiring some suppliers not to sell products to any other retailers, exclusivity arrangements
were not included in the ﬁnal report due to insuﬃcient evidence. See also FTC (2001) for
more examples of exclusionary practices in retailing.
5‘If the relationship should go sour, it would be too bad for Wal-Mart. It would be
devastating for P&G’ (Fishman, 2006, p234).
2the implementation of the single market is attributed in part to the role of
intermediaries. Similarly, Javorcik, Keller and Tybout (2008) report that the
main eﬀect of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the Mexican
soaps, detergents and surfactant industry is less due to the reduction in
trade costs or to the entry of foreign manufacturers than to ‘the fundamental
change in relationship’ between manufacturers and retailers once Walmex
(Wal-Mart of Mexico) entered the market and exercised its bargaining power.
Not surprisingly, powerful buyers are also major participants in interna-
tional markets. Wal-Mart alone accounts today for 15% of total US imports
from China (Basker and Van, 2008), and imports more than half of its non-
food products (Smith, 2004). In the apparel market, 48% of the apparel sold
by US retailers in 1993 were imported against 12% in 19756, and in the socks
industry, the US imported 670 million pairs of socks in 2004 against 12 million
pairs in 2001 (Konzelmann et al., 2007). Greater reliance on international
markets is also reﬂected by the fact that, by the mid-1970s, most major US
retailers had overseas buying oﬃces, especially in East Asia, with contacts
with a large network of suppliers. Gereﬃ (1999) sees the role of ‘buyer-driven
global commodity chains’7 as critical to understand why, despite formidable
spatial and cultural distances, countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and now China have been so successful in exporting
to Western countries.
The analysis of buyer power dates back to Galbraith (1952) who looked at
it as a countervailing power, i.e., as oﬀsetting manufacturers’ market power.
Since then the industrial organization literature has concluded that the im-
pact of higher concentration on the buyer side of the market on consumer
6See Gereﬃ (1999). The picture is similar for Europe.
7In addition to large retailers, examples of buyer-driven chains include well-known
marketers that carry no production such as Liz Claiborne, Nike and Reebok (see Gereﬃ,
1999). See also Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) who argue that the retail revolution in
the US is key to understand Asia development and the diﬀerent responses in Korea and
Taiwan.
3prices and welfare was ambiguous.8 Essentially, buyer power given monop-
olistic power at the supplier level constitutes a second-best solution. Thus,
increased buyer power can lead to lower retail prices and higher welfare pro-
vided sellers themselves have power. If however sellers have little or no power,
increased buyer power unambiguously leads to higher retail prices and lower
welfare.
The more recent industrial organization literature notes that buyers with
market power have several diﬀerent contractual tools at their disposal, and
it aims at understanding the implications of some of these tools on retail
prices and welfare. For instance, Marx and Shaﬀer (2007) show that retailers
with buyer power may use up-front payments, such as slotting allowances, to
exclude other retailers. Rey and al. (2005) also consider buyers’ use of such
contracts but, in addition, allow the terms of the contract to be conditional
on exclusivity. This recent literature generally concludes that retailers with
market power have considerable scope for anti-competitive behavior. The
exclusion of rival retailers, in particular, increases buyer concentration, and
leads to higher consumer prices and lower welfare.9
By looking explicitly at the contractual arrangements between sellers and
buyers, the point of departure of the present paper is the recent literature
in industrial organization. It extends the analysis to an international envi-
ronment characterized by barriers to trade and asymmetries in the market
shares of manufacturers. We are particularly interested in understanding
how trade liberalization aﬀects consumer prices and welfare in the presence
of buyer power, and how this compares to a world in which producers have
market power.
The existing international trade literature on intermediaries does not gen-
8Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) show that increased
concentration in the buyer market does not necessarily lead to lower consumer prices. Chen
(2003) shows that an increase in countervailing power does lower retail prices provided a
competitive fringe is present in retailing.
9Inderst and Wey (2006) look at suppliers’ incentives to invest in product innovation
in response to buyer power.
4erally deal with buyer power.10 Basker and Van (2008) is, to our knowledge,
the only paper on buyer power in an international trade context. Their
goal, however, is diﬀerent from ours since they want to explain why, in the
presence of economies of scale in retailing and in the import process, trade
liberalization has led to an explosion of imports by a large retail chain (i.e.,
Wal-Mart).
We obtain two main results. First, trade liberalization in the presence
of buyer power may lead to higher retail prices and lower welfare. This is
due to the fact that trade liberalization may lead to an increase in market
concentration in retailing. Speciﬁcally, powerful retailers may choose to use
exclusive contracts that foreclose rivals in free trade but not in autarky. We
ﬁnd an even stronger result in the case of unilateral trade liberalization:
unilateral free trade leads to lower welfare as compared to autarky unless
contracts switch from being exclusive in autarky to being non-exclusive in
free trade. Second, the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade liberalization is weaker
in markets with buyer power than in markets with seller power.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a
simple two-country model of international trade with two domestic retailers
and one manufacturer in each country. In Section 3 we derive the equilibria in
autarky and free trade. In Section 4 we compare these equilibria to determine
the eﬀect of trade liberalization on distribution contracts, retail prices and
social welfare. In addition, we compare the eﬀects of buyer power with those
resulting from seller power. Conclusions and extensions follow in Section 5.
The Appendix contains proofs.
10See Rauch (2001) on the role of networks in international trade, Feenstra and Hanson
(2004) on the role of Hong Kong intermediaries with respect to Chinese products, Raﬀ and
Schmitt (2005, 2006) on the role of exclusive territory and exclusive dealing in international
markets, and Richardson (2004) on the comparison between exclusivity in the distribution
of domestic products and trade policy to restrict the market access of foreign producers.
There is of course a large trade literature on vertical relationships among manufacturers
(see Helpman, 2006; Spencer and Jones, 1991). The emphasis of this literature is not on
buyer power either.
52 The Model
In this section, we develop a simple trade model with two identical countries,
home and foreign, and segmented markets. In each country there are two
diﬀerentiated retailers, who distribute a product in the local market, and
one manufacturer. Whereas the retailers sell only in their local market (their
services are non-tradeable), they can buy the (homogeneous) good they dis-
tribute from the local manufacturer, import it from the manufacturer located
abroad, or both. Importing a good from abroad involves a trade cost of t
per unit. Given the additional assumption that production involves a con-
stant marginal cost, c, in both countries, we can concentrate on analyzing
the market equilibrium in the home country, knowing that the same analysis
applies to the foreign country.
Hence consider the two home country retailers, 1 and 2, and let the mar-
ginal cost of retailing be normalized to zero. Retailer diﬀerentiation comes
from the fact that they have diﬀerent characteristics that consumers value,
such as location, or oﬀer diﬀerent customer services. The representative do-











i − bq1q2 + y, (1)
where qi denotes the quantity of the good bought from retailer i, and y the
consumption of the numeraire good which can be traded across countries at
no cost. Parameter b ∈ [0,1) reﬂects the degree of substitutability between
retailers. If b = 0, retail services are not substitutable, and each retailer acts
as a monopolist; if b = 1, the retailers are perfectly substitutable. Denoting
income by I and the retail price of retailer i by pi, the consumer’s budget
constraint is ￿
i
piqi + y = I. (2)
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and inverting the resulting ﬁrst-order condi-
tions yields the following demand function for retailer i = 1,2:
6Di(pi,pj) =
1 − b − pi + bpj
1 − b2 , i  = j. (3)
We identify buyer power with the assumption that retailers have all the
bargaining power in their relationship with the manufacturers, and hence
are able to make take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀers to the manufacturers. The
contracts consist of a two-part tariﬀ, i.e., a wholesale price and a ﬁxed fee, and
may be contingent on whether a manufacturer sells exclusively to the retailer
or also supplies the other retailer. We denote the case of exclusivity by E
and the case of non-exclusivity by N. The wholesale price (ﬁxed transfer)
oﬀered by retailer i = 1,2 is denoted by wk
i (T k
i ), where k = E,N. A contract
oﬀer by retailer i hence is a pair (T E
i ,wE
i ) and (T N
i ,wN
i ).11 Retailers whose
contracts have been accepted then choose retail prices pi, i = 1,2.
The strategic interactions between the retailers and between them and
the manufacturers takes the form of the following three-stage game:
1. Retailers 1 and 2 make simultaneous contract oﬀers to manufacturers
h and f.
2. Manufacturers h and f simultaneously decide whether to accept con-
tracts from one retailer, both retailers or none of the contracts.
3. The relevant contracts are implemented and the retailers whose con-
tracts were accepted choose retail prices simultaneously.
We solve this game for pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria beginning
with the case of autarky, and then considering the case of non-prohibitive
trade costs. In autarky retailers in the home country can only buy from
manufacturer h, whereas with lower trade costs they may also buy from f.
Before presenting the details of the equilibria, it is useful to deﬁne the
maximum total industry proﬁt that could be generated by all players acting
11A retailer may oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to the two manufacturers. For notational
convenience we only make this explicit–by introducing an additional subscript in the
contracts–when it is necessary to avoid confusion.
7together as Πm, and the maximumjoint proﬁt that could be earned by a single
active retailer i together with the manufacturers (when the other retailer
does not sell) as Πm






4 . Assuming throughout the paper that c < 1, we have Πm = 2Πm
i
for b = 0 and Πm < 2Πm
i for b > 0.
3 Characterization of the Equilibria
3.1 Autarky
There are two types of equilibria that can arise in autarky: in the ﬁrst type
one of the retailers has an exclusive contract with the manufacturer while
the other retailer does not sell; in the second type, both retailers sell the
manufacturer’s product under non-exclusive contracts. Although in autarky,
our model becomes an application of Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 of Rey,
Thal and Vergé (2005), it is useful to characterize these equilibria in some
detail.
An equilibrium in which one of the retailers has an exclusive contract
with the manufacturer always exists in autarky. Simply, if retailer 1 insists
on exclusivity, retailer 2 cannot do better than also insist on exclusivity,
and vice versa. Retailer i = 1,2 then oﬀers ￿ wi
E = c so as to maximize
the joint proﬁt with the manufacturer, and sets ˜ T E
i to transfer this proﬁt
to the manufacturer. The contract also speciﬁes a suﬃciently unattractive
payment to the manufacturer in case he also sells to the rival retailer. The
manufacturer accepts one of the contracts. Since the demand faced by the
active retailer is simply D(p) = 1−p, the active retailer’s proﬁt-maximizing
price, given the wholesale price, is ˜ pE = c + 1−c
2 . Since the two retailers are
identical, the only way of making sure that the manufacturer accepts the
exclusive contract is for each retailer to oﬀer a ﬁxed fee that shifts the entire
monopoly proﬁt to the manufacturer. Hence, in an exclusive equilibrium,
both retailers earn zero proﬁts, ˜ πE
1 = ˜ πE
2 = 0, and the manufacturer earns




4 . The intuition behind this distribution
of rents is simple: the retailers are competing with each other to be the
manufacturer’s exclusive distributor; this competition forces them to “bid”
their maximal willingness to pay for exclusivity.
There may also exist an equilibrium, in which the manufacturer accepts
non-exclusive contracts so that both retailers carry the manufacturer’s prod-
uct. This equilibrium is characterized by two conditions. The ﬁrst condition
is that the wholesale price oﬀered by a retailer has to maximize the joint
proﬁt of the retailer and the manufacturer given the wholesale price oﬀered
by the rival retailer. Hence, as proved in connection with Proposition 1
below, the equilibrium wholesale prices (˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ) must satisfy
˜ wi = argmaxwi {πi(wi, ˜ w−i) + πh(wi, ˜ w−i)}, i,−i = 1,2. (4)
If this condition was not satisﬁed, the retailer could adjust the wholesale
price, keep the proﬁt left to the manufacturer constant by adjusting the
ﬁxed fee, and thereby raise his own proﬁt. The second condition is that the
manufacturer has to be indiﬀerent between accepting one retailer’s exclusive
contract and accepting both retailers non-exclusive contracts. If the man-
ufacturer strictly preferred the non-exclusive contract, at least one retailer
could reduce his transfer to the manufacturer. Since a retailer i together with
the manufacturer can guarantee themselves a proﬁt of Πm
i under an exclusive
contract, a necessary condition for non-exclusive contracts to be accepted in
equilibrium is that the proﬁt of retailer i and of the manufacturer be greater
or equal to Πm
i . Speciﬁcally, there is no deviation to exclusivity if
πi( ˜ w
N
1 , ˜ w
N
2 ) + πh( ˜ w
N
1 , ˜ w
N
2 ) ≥ Π
m
i . (5)
Deﬁning the total industry proﬁt under a non-exclusive contract as ˜ ΠN =
π1( ˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ) + π2( ˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ) + πh( ˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ), we can rewrite (5) as ˜ ΠN − Πm
1 ≥
π2( ˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ) when i = 1. Since π2( ˜ wN
1 , ˜ wN
2 ) ≥ 0, the condition under which





Proposition 1 summarizes the discussion:13
Proposition 1 In autarky, an equilibrium with exclusive contract always
exists. If b ≤ 0.73205, there also exists an equilibrium under which both
retailers buy from the manufacturer under non-exclusive contracts.
Proof: See Appendix.
Given the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to ﬁnd out that retail prices
in the non-exclusive equilibrium are:
˜ p
N
i = c +
(2 − b)(1 − c)
4
. (7)
Not surprisingly, ˜ pN
i < ˜ pE for b > 0 so that the non-exclusive-contract equilib-
rium induces more competition than the exclusive-contract one. Obviously,
the retailers need to be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated for the non-exclusive equi-
librium to exist. Only in this case are rents large enough to prevent retailers
from deviating by oﬀering an exclusive distribution arrangement to the man-
ufacturer. More precisely, the rents obtained by each retailer correspond to
his contribution to total industry proﬁt (i.e., the diﬀerence between industry
proﬁt in the non-exclusive equilibrium and the joint proﬁt that the manufac-
turer and the other retailer could generate by agreeing on an exclusive deal).
The remaining rent goes to the manufacturer.
12See Rey et al.(2005) for the original proof. A generalization of this result is provided
in Lemma 1 below.
13Rey et al. (2005) argue that, from the retailers’ point of view, an exclusive equilibrium
is payoﬀ dominated by an equilibrium with non-exclusive contracts, and invoke cheap-talk
between the retailers to eliminate the payoﬀ-dominated equilibria. We choose instead to
work with all possible equilibria.
103.2 Non-prohibitive Trade Cost
Now consider equilibrium contracts when the trade cost is suﬃciently low to
enable retailers to buy from abroad. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in
which both retailers sell a positive quantity. The proﬁts of retailer i = 1,2
and the manufacturers will then typically be functions of the trade cost t.
Like in autarky, a necessary condition for the existence of such an equilib-
rium is that the total industry proﬁt, in this case denoted by ΠN(t), be higher
than the joint proﬁt that can be earned when one retailer sets up an exclusive
arrangement that monopolizes the retail market. That is, the possibility of
foreclosure limits how much rent retailers may earn in an equilibrium with
non-exclusive contracts, and guarantees that at least one manufacturer earns
a positive proﬁt. The maximum rent that can be earned in an exclusive
arrangement is achieved when the retailer satisﬁes his entire demand by buy-
ing from the local manufacturer. This rent is hence independent of the trade
cost and given by Πm
i =
(1−c)2
4 , just like in autarky. In particular, we can
prove the following result:
Lemma 1 Suppose an equilibrium exists in which both retailers are active.
Then it is necessarily the case that ΠN(t) ≥ Πm
i , and that the sum of manu-
facturers’ proﬁts is positive.
Proof: See Appendix.
In autarky both retailers have to buy from the local manufacturer. Will
they still do so if trade is liberalized? To see that it cannot be the case for
a suﬃciently low trade cost, suppose that an equilibrium with two active
retailers exists, and that the trade cost is zero. We know from Lemma 1
that, in such an equilibrium, the two manufacturers together have to earn
positive proﬁts. Consider two cases: ﬁrst, both retailers buy all their goods
from the same manufacturer. This implies that this manufacturer earns
positive proﬁt, whereas the inactive manufacturer earns zero proﬁt. This
cannot happen in equilibrium: a retailer would beneﬁt from deviating and
11buying from the inactive manufacturer since he would have to oﬀer him
only an inﬁnitesimally small transfer. Second, one retailer buys positive
quantities from both manufacturers. This cannot occur in equilibrium, since
the retailer can procure all of his goods from one manufacturer in exchange
for an inﬁnitesimally higher transfer to that manufacturer, thereby saving
the rent transferred to the other manufacturer. The same arguments have
to hold if the trade cost is positive but suﬃciently small. This proves the
following Lemma:
Lemma 2 If an equilibrium exists in which both retailers are active and if the
trade cost is suﬃciently low, each retailer buys from a diﬀerent manufacturer.
Note that each retailer does not need to forbid its supplier to sell to the
rival retailer in this two-retailer-two-manufacturer environment. It is simply
in the interest of each retailer not to buy from several manufacturers. Strictly
speaking, the contracts are therefore non-exclusive, even though they have
the appearance of exclusive contracts because each manufacturer supplies a
diﬀerent retailer.
The fact that each retailer buys from a separate manufacturer when the
trade cost is suﬃciently small has implications for wholesale prices and ul-
timately for the degree of competition between retailers. If retailer 1 is
the one who buys from the domestic manufacturer, his wholesale price has
to maximize their joint proﬁt given retailer 2’s wholesale price. That is,
the objective function is (p1(w1,w2) − c)q1(w1,w2). The wholesale price
of retailer 2 who imports goods from the foreign manufacturer maximizes
(p2(w1,w2) − c − t)q2(w1,w2). Let ˆ wN
1 and ˆ wN
2 denote the corresponding
Nash equilibrium wholesale prices.
These objective functions diﬀer from those in autarky, where both retail-
ers purchase from the domestic manufacturer in one important respect. In
autarky, a retailer has to take into account that, by lowering the wholesale
price and therefore also his retail price, the manufacturer loses sales to the
12rival retailer. The manufacturer only accepts a reduction in the wholesale
price if he receives compensation for these lost sales. When the trade cost is
suﬃciently low so that each retailer buys from a separate manufacturer, the
incentive to reduce wholesale prices is larger than in autarky simply because
there is no need to compensate the manufacturer for any lost sales to the
rival. In other words, if the trade cost is suﬃciently small, retailers engage
in tougher price competition than in autarky.
The tougher competition between retailers induced by low trade costs has
implications for the equilibrium contracts. In particular, if both retailers are
active, the total industry proﬁt for suﬃciently low t is smaller than the total
industry proﬁt in autarky: ΠN(t) < ˜ ΠN. Since the maximum proﬁt that can
be earned in an exclusive distribution arrangement in which one retailer is
foreclosed, Πm
i , is independent of t, this means that there may be situations
in which an equilibrium with two active retailers exists in autarky but does
not exist for a suﬃciently low trade cost. In other words, we may observe
that ΠN(t) < Πm
i < ˜ ΠN so that the necessary condition for the existence of
an equilibrium in which both retailers are active holds in autarky but not in
free trade.
Figure 1 generalizes the above idea since we know that ΠN(t) and ˜ ΠN are
decreasing functions of b, whereas Πm
i is independent of b. This means that,
given a suﬃciently low t, there is a range of b’s (￿ b(t) ≤ b ≤ ￿ b in Figure 1)
for which there may exist an equilibrium in which both retailers are active
in autarky but not for t close enough to zero. In other words, by increasing
competition under non-exclusive contracts, trade liberalization may induce
exclusive contracts and monopolization of the retail market.
To formally establish this possibility, we provide a full characterization
of the equilibria in free trade, and then compare the equilibria under au-
tarky and free trade. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium
outcomes in free trade:
Proposition 2 If b ≤ 0.67209, there exists an equilibrium in free trade in
13which both retailers are active, each buying from a separate manufacturer.
If b ≥ 0.61803, there exists an equilibrium in free trade in which only one
retailer is active; this retailer has exclusive contracts with both manufacturers.
Proof: See Appendix.
It should be clear that, with two manufacturers, it is more diﬃcult for
a retailer to foreclose his rival than in autarky since he would have to sign
exclusivity contracts with both manufacturers. Indeed, suppose that retailer
1 oﬀers an exclusive contract to both manufacturers. He has to oﬀer both
of them the same payment since, otherwise, retailer 2 would ﬁnd it easier to
convince the manufacturer receiving the less advantageous deal from retailer
1 to sell to him. The best deal that 1 can oﬀer is to set the wholesale price
equal to the manufacturers’ marginal cost and to pay each manufacturer a
ﬁxed fee equal to half the monopoly proﬁt that he earns. But we also must
check retailer 2’s best response. Obviously, he cannot oﬀer more than retailer
1 if he were to make oﬀers to both manufacturers. But retailer 2 could also
make an oﬀer to just one manufacturer. Naturally, one does not expect
that such an oﬀer will be proﬁtable for a manufacturer if price competition
between retailers is tough enough, i.e., if b is suﬃciently close to one.
In the free-trade equilibrium in which both retailers are active, the retail
price charged by retailer i can be shown to be
ˆ p
N
i = c +
2(1 − b)(1 − c)
4 − b(2 + b)
. (8)
Each retailer earns a proﬁt equal to his contribution to overall industry proﬁt,
and, as pointed out in Lemma 1, the manufacturers make positive proﬁts.
In the exclusive-contract equilibrium, we obviously obtain the same retail
price as in the equivalent autarky equilibrium, namely ￿ pE = c + 1−c
2 . Both
domestic retailers earn zero proﬁts, ￿ π
E
1 = ￿ π
E
2 = 0, whereas the two manufac-
turers share the resulting industry proﬁts equally. Since the two countries
are identical, the active foreign retailer also divides his entire proﬁts equally
14between the two manufacturers. Thus, the domestic manufacturer makes the
same overall proﬁt in the exclusive equilibrium as in the equivalent autarky




4 ; however, in this case, the proﬁt is the sum
of payments from the active retailers in both countries.
Obviously, trade liberalization has eﬀects on consumer prices, consumer
surplus and proﬁts. These eﬀects come from two sources. First, if both
retailers are active before and after trade liberalization, they pay diﬀerent
wholesale prices and charge diﬀerent consumer prices in equilibrium. Second,
free trade may involve a switch in contract either from exclusivity to non-
exclusivity or the other way round. Retail market structure would then
change from a retail monopoly to a retail duopoly or vice versa.
4 The Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
4.1 Prices and Welfare
We can now compare equilibrium distribution arrangements and their eﬀects
on retail prices and welfare in free trade and autarky. The outcome depends
on the type of contract observed in the autarky equilibrium and on the degree
of diﬀerentiation between the two retailers (i.e., the value of b). The results
are summarized below:
Proposition 3 A. Suppose the autarky equilibrium involves exclusive con-
tracts. Then in free trade: (i) if b ≤ 0.61803, both retailers switch to
non-exclusive contracts and retail prices are lower than in autarky; (ii)
if 0.61803 < b ≤ 0.67209, either there is still an equilibrium with ex-
clusive contracts, or both retailers switch to non-exclusive contracts. In
the former case, retail prices remain constant; otherwise they are lower
than in autarky; (iii) if b > 0.67209, contracts remain exclusive and
retail prices do not change.
B. Suppose the autarky equilibrium involves non-exclusive contracts. Then
15in free trade: (i) if b ≤ 0.61803, there is no change in contracts but re-
tail prices are lower than in autarky; (ii) if 0.61803 < b ≤ 0.67209, ei-
ther there is still an equilibrium with non-exclusive contracts and prices
are lower than in autarky, or contracts switch to being exclusive and
prices are higher than in autarky; (iii) if 0.67209 < b ≤ 0.73205, retail-
ers adopt exclusive contracts and prices are higher than in autarky.
Proof: See Appendix.
Not surprisingly, free trade tends to lead to more competition and lower
retail prices given exclusive contracts in autarky. This is especially true
when retailers are poor substitutes, since in this case retail market structure
changes from a monopoly to a duopoly as retailers switch to non-exclusive
contracts. Free trade also leads to more competition and lower prices for con-
sumers when contracts are non-exclusive in both autarky and free trade. The
reason is that in autarky each retailer internalizes the eﬀect of his wholesale
price on the single manufacturer. Speciﬁcally, reducing the wholesale price
means that the retailer has to compensate the manufacturer for lost sales
to the rival retailer. This keeps wholesale prices and, therefore, retail prices
high. In free trade, each retailer buys from a diﬀerent manufacturer. There
is thus no need to compensate the supplier for any lost sales to the rival
retailer. This makes it more attractive to lower the wholesale price in order
to take market share away from the rival retailer, reducing retail prices in
the process.
Trade liberalization may also lead to a retail monopoly. This is the case
when autarky involves non-exclusive contracts and retailers are close sub-
stitutes. The intuition for this surprising result is simple: because trade
liberalization would lead to much tougher price competition if there were no
monopoly, each retailer has an incentive to try even harder to foreclose his
rival by imposing an exclusive contract on the manufacturers.
Interestingly, trade liberalization in markets with buyer power, instead
of creating more competition as one might expect, may thus have the exact
16opposite eﬀect. Indeed, Case B.(iii) is one where the concentration ratio in
retailing is unambiguously higher in free trade than in autarky. Although,
in both cases, there is just one manufacturer selling, the distribution sector
features two active retailers in autarky but only one in free trade.
Next, we examine how bilateral trade liberalization aﬀects domestic social
welfare. Domestic social welfare (W) consists of the sum of consumer surplus
(CS), the two domestic retailers’ proﬁts (πi) and the domestic manufacturer’s
proﬁt (πh):




The following welfare results mirror the eﬀect of trade liberalization on con-
sumer prices:
Proposition 4 In the presence of buyer power, bilateral trade liberalization
implies that domestic social welfare: (i) increases if b ≤ 0.61803; (ii) in-
creases, remains unchanged or decreases if 0.61803 < b ≤ 0.67209; and (iii)
decreases or remains unchanged if b > 0.67209.
Proof: See Appendix.
Trade liberalization raises social welfare (Cases i-ii) because it leads to
tougher price competition and hence a smaller deadweight loss. This is rem-
iniscent of traditional trade models except that the pro-competitive eﬀect
now occurs in retailing rather than in manufacturing. The fact that welfare
may fall (Cases ii-iii) is due to the fact that contracts may switch from non-
exclusive in autarky to exclusive in free trade. In this case, the retail price
increases as one retailer monopolizes the market in free trade. The result
that domestic welfare may remain unchanged (Cases ii-iii) arises when only
one retailer is active in both countries in free trade and in autarky. In this
case, retail prices and hence consumer surplus are unchanged, and the active
domestic retailer’s transfer of rents to the foreign manufacturer is just oﬀset
by the active foreign retailer’s transfer of rent to the home manufacturer.
17If the home government liberalizes trade unilaterally, these oﬀsetting
transfers by the foreign retailer to the domestic manufacturer no longer take
place. In this case, the foreign manufacturer receives a signiﬁcant share of
the home industry proﬁt in free trade. This is straightforward in the case
of exclusive contracts: half the domestic industry proﬁt now goes to the
foreign manufacturer to prevent him from accepting an exclusive contract
from the rival retailer. When contracts are non-exclusive, the reason that
the foreign manufacturer, like his domestic counterpart, receives a positive
proﬁt is that here, too, he has to be compensated for not signing an exclusive
contract with the rival retailer. Hence the rather paradoxical result that, de-
spite buyer power, free trade induces a signiﬁcant shift of rents to the foreign
manufacturer. It is only in the case where contracts switch from exclusiv-
ity in autarky to non-exclusive contracts in free trade that this transfer of
rents abroad does not more than oﬀsets the positive eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on consumer surplus. In all the other cases, the shift of rents to the
foreign manufacturer comes on top of the fact that trade liberalization may
lower consumer surplus or leave it unchanged. Hence we obtain the following
clear-cut result:
Proposition 5 In the presence of buyer power, unilateral trade liberalization
unambiguously reduces domestic social welfare unless contracts are exclusive
in autarky and non-exclusive in free trade.
Proof: See Appendix.
4.2 Buyer versus Seller Power
The size of the rents accruing to the retailers and to the manufacturers is
obviously not the same whether it is the retailers or the manufacturers who
have all the bargaining power. But this is not the main diﬀerence between
seller and buyer power. In this section, we want to point out another key dif-
18ference, namely that the equilibrium prices and consequently the competitive
eﬀects of free trade are diﬀerent.
To see this, assume that the manufacturers have all the bargaining power
and make take-it-or-leave-it contract oﬀers to the two retailers. In autarky
and thus in the presence of a single manufacturer and two retailers, manu-
facturer i sets a wholesale price equal to




Equilibrium retail prices are




and the manufacturer uses the ﬁxed fee to extract all proﬁts fromthe retailers.








The manufacturer is thus able to completely monopolize the market. He
does so by setting a high wholesale price that internalizes the competition
between the retailers. Obviously then, the proﬁt earned by the manufacturer
is higher than in the exclusive-contract equilibrium with buyer power, since
in the latter equilibrium only one retailer is active. It is also higher than in
the non-exclusive-contract equilibrium. More signiﬁcantly, it leads to retail
prices in autarky that are at least as high under seller power as under buyer
power. To show this, it suﬃces to compute (pi − ￿ pN
i ) as given by (10) and
(7) respectively, which yields






The retail prices are of course identical under seller power and under buyer
power when there are exclusive contracts in the latter case.
19Next, we examine contracts and retail prices under free trade. The ﬁrst
step is to prove that with seller power we do not obtain equilibria in which
one of the manufacturers is excluded from the market:
Lemma 3 Under seller power there does not exist an equilibrium in which in
free trade both retailers buy from only one manufacturer under an exclusive
contract, and the other manufacturer does not sell.
Proof: See Appendix.
The reason for this result is as follows: a manufacturer wishing to impose
an exclusive contract can oﬀer each retailer at most a proﬁt of   πm/2 to
prevent them from buying from the rival manufacturer. As indicated above,
the retail price would have to be equal to   wi to realize these proﬁts. However,
by setting a lower wholesale price, the inactive manufacturer can generate a
rent that is greater than   πm/2 so that it can induce one of the retailers to
break the exclusive contract.
This leaves the case of non-exclusive contracts. The setting where man-
ufacturers make non-exclusive contract oﬀers to retailers has been examined
by Shaﬀer (1991). In Shaﬀer’s paper there is a continuum of manufacturers.
However, it is straightforward to show that his result also holds for the case
of two homogenous manufacturers, one in each country. Moreover, the equi-
librium retail prices that Shaﬀer obtains are the same as those we computed
for the non-exclusive-contract equilibrium under buyer power.14 If free trade
leads to an exclusive-contract equilibrium under buyer power, then retail
prices must obviously be higher than under seller power.
Proposition 6 summarizes the above discussion.
14This is due to the fact that in the non-exclusive-contract equilibrium–just like in
Shaﬀer (1991)–each retailer buys from a single manufacturer, so that equilibrium whole-
sale price maximizes the joint proﬁt of a retailer/manufacturer pair given the equilibrium
price of the other pair. However, the rents are shared diﬀerently between retailers and
manufacturers, with manufacturers obtaining a positive share under buyer power and zero
proﬁt under seller power.
20Proposition 6 The autarky retail prices are never lower under seller power
than under buyer power. The free-trade retail prices are the same under
buyer and seller power if b ≤ 0.61803; but buyer power leads to identical or
to higher retail prices in free trade than seller power if b > 0.61803.
An immediate corollary emerges from Proposition 6:
Corollary 1 The pro-competitive eﬀect of free trade (as compared to au-
tarky) is unambiguously greater under seller power than under buyer power.
This is the case because, as compared to seller power, buyer power tends
to lead to more price competition in autarky (the two retailers are active
despite a single source of supply) but not in free trade where price competition
is either as intense as under seller power (when both retailers are active) or
less intense when one of the retailers is foreclosed.
5 Conclusions
Opening up markets to the forces of international trade has traditionally been
seen as a policy tool capable of unleashing pro-competitive forces and induc-
ing domestic industries that are imperfectly competitive to become more
competitive and more eﬃcient. In essence, opening a country to interna-
tional trade allows for rents to be dissipated to the beneﬁt of consumers.
Typically in such a situation, the pro-competitive eﬀects of freer trade are
thought to be large not only because barriers that distort trade are being
eliminated, but also because market power gets diluted. This process has
surely been present in many liberalization episodes. However, producers’
rents may not always be dissipated by competition. There are often other
agents ready to capture a share of these rents if they have an opportunity to
do so. This is the case for intermediaries, especially if they are unavoidable
agents in the process of reaching consumers. Since the economic power of
these intermediaries is on the rise and since one can naturally expect them
21to play a signiﬁcant role in distributing foreign products, it is important to
understand better their role in international markets.
This paper has started to look at the implications of the existence of such
agents when they have buyer power, i.e., when they have suﬃcient market
power to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to producers. The main conclusions
are that trade liberalization could bring less competition and lower welfare,
and that pro-competitive eﬀects tend to be smaller under buyer power than
under seller power. Thus, big retailers like Wal-Mart may have non-trivial
trade liberalization eﬀects. The results of the present paper are also con-
sistent with the EU Commission’s intuition that diﬀerent degrees of buyer
power across the EU might help explain the lack of signiﬁcant price conver-
gence for consumer goods within the EU. In short, the role of buyer power
may help explain why competitive and welfare gains from the 1992 EU sin-
gle market experiment have been lower than expected (see Grin, 2003, for
a full discussion). We also obtain some surprising results along the way. In
particular, the rents existing at the manufacturer level in autarky may con-
tinue to be completely captured by manufacturers in free trade even if there
is an additional source of supply and (imperfect) competition among retail-
ers. In other words, buyer power by itself does not necessarily imply that
retailers capture the rents generated by trade liberalization at the expense
of manufacturers.
It is easy to modify that last outcome by introducing heterogeneity among
retailers and, in particular, by assuming that retailer 1 faces a lower unit
retail cost than retailer 2. This has two main implications. The ﬁrst and
obvious one is that, in an equilibrium with exclusive contracts, retailer 1
is not only the sole active retailer but also earns positive proﬁts. Hence
retailer 1 now shares rents with the manufacturers. Not surprisingly, the
greater the diﬀerence between the retailing unit costs, the greater the proﬁt
earned by the active retailer.15 The second implication is that asymmetric
15Speciﬁcally, retailer 1’s net proﬁt is π1 = 1
4(1 − c1 − c)2 − 1
4(1 − c2 − c)2 and the
22retail costs change the retailers’ incentives to adopt exclusive contracts. In
particular, the low-cost retailer now has an advantage over the high-cost
retailer that in itself gives him an incentive to exclude the high-cost retailer.
It is then not surprising to ﬁnd that, with retail cost asymmetry, the range of
values of b over which exclusive contracts arise in equilibrium unambiguously
increases as compared to the case with symmetric retail costs. In other
words, with asymmetric retail costs, retailers can be less diﬀerentiated before
an exclusive equilibrium emerges than they need to be without them. Of
course, increasing the number of manufacturers would make foreclosure more
diﬃcult. But the above discussion suggests that exclusive contracts would
still be possible at least in the presence of suﬃcient asymmetries among
retailers.
It is important to keep in mind that the present paper does not propose
a theory of buyer power since buyer power in our model is exogenous: the
retailers have all the bargaining power irrespective of the trade environment.
It only spells out the implications of the existence of buyer power in an
international context. This is of course a ﬁrst step, one that already produces
interesting results that diﬀer substantially from those associated with seller
power. Thus the present paper has nothing to say with respect to the idea
that buyer power might be a by-product of freer trade. It should be clear,
however, that if it is true that trade liberalization is an important element
in the emergence of buyer power, then our main conclusions would hold a
fortiori.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof has two parts. First, we derive wholesale prices assuming an
equilibrium exists. Second, we establish that a non-exclusive equilibrium
manufacturer proﬁt is 1
4(1 − c2 − c)2 where c1 (c2) is retailer 1 (retailer 2)’s unit cost.
23exists for b ≤ 0.73205.
The joint proﬁt of retailer i and the manufacturer when the rival retailer,
denoted by −i, oﬀers contract (T N
−i,wN

































































where the ﬁrst term is retailer i’s proﬁt, the second term the manufacturer’s
proﬁt from selling to retailer i (both gross of retailer i’s ﬁxed transfer), and
the third term is the manufacturer’s proﬁt from selling to the rival retailer
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Next, we show that the following contract oﬀer of retailer i = 1,2 consti-




i = πi(￿ wN
i , ￿ wN
−i) −
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2 − ˜ ΠN.
Given these contracts, the manufacturer earns a proﬁt of Πm
1 + Πm
2 −
˜ ΠN either by accepting non-exclusive contracts from both retailers or by
accepting an exclusive contract from one of them. Accepting a non-exclusive
contract is hence a best response for the manufacturer, provided that the
contract oﬀers him at least this much proﬁt. In the proposed non-exclusive-









This proﬁt is non-negative for b ≤ 0.73205. Since ￿ wN
i constitutes a best
response and the manufacturer does not accept a lower transfer, retailer i
cannot gain by oﬀering another non-exclusive contract. In addition, retailer
i cannot beneﬁt from oﬀering a diﬀerent exclusive contract, since any contract
involving a smaller transfer to the manufacturer would not be accepted.
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose an equilibrium exists in which both retailers are active. Denote








f denote the resulting total
industry proﬁt derived from sales in the home country given trade cost t.
Then it must be the case that retailer i and manufacturer j together earn
at least as much as they could if they foreclosed the rival retailer −i while







i − ˆ π−j,
where ˆ π−j is the compensation payment. Using the deﬁnition of ΠN(t), this






i + (ˆ π−j − π
N
−j). (13)
25Note that ˆ π−j ≤ πN
−j since there is no need to pay −j strictly more than
he would have earned in equilibrium. Since ˆ π−j ≤ πN
−j, (13) implies that
a retailer’s proﬁt cannot exceed his contribution to total industry proﬁt.
Individual rationality implies πN
i ≥ 0 and hence a necessary condition for an









Next, given the deﬁnition of ΠN, it is the case that πN
h + πN
f = ΠN −
πN
1 − πN














1 +(ˆ πf −π
N
f )).
Simplifying and re-arranging, ˆ πh+ˆ πf ≥ Πm
1 +Πm
2 −ΠN(t). Since Πm
1 +Πm
2 −
Πm > 0 for b > 0 and Πm ≥ ΠN(t), it follows that Πm
1 + Πm
2 − ΠN(t) > 0 so
that ˆ πh+ˆ πf > 0. Finally, since ˆ πf ≤ πN
f and ˆ πh ≤ πN
h , we have πN
h +πN
f > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof has two parts. First, we establish that for b ≥ 0.61803 there
exists an equilibrium in which one of the retailers does not sell. Second,
we show that there exists an equilibrium in which both retailers sell if b ≤
0.67209.
Suppose that retailer −i oﬀers an exclusive contract to both manufac-
turers, where ˆ wE
−i = c and ˆ T E
−i =
(1−c)2
8 (so that each manufacturer receives
half the monopoly proﬁt). To break the exclusivity, retailer i has to make
a better oﬀer to a single manufacturer j. Given ˆ wE
−i = c proﬁt maximizing
retail prices are:
pi =
(2 − b − b2 + 2wi + bc)
4 − b2 and p−i =
(2 − b − b2 + 2c + bwi)
4 − b2 .
The joint proﬁt of retailer i and the single manufacturer j hence is
26Πi,j(wi,c) = (pi(wi,c) − c)
(2 − b − b2 − (2 − b2)wi + bc)
(4 − b2)(1 − b2)
.
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and the resulting joint proﬁt is equal to
Πi,j =
(1 − c)2(1 − b)(2 + b)2




8 if b < 0.61803. Hence only for b ≥ 0.61803 does there exist an
exclusive-contract equilibrium in which one of the retailers does not sell.
We have to show that the following contract oﬀer of retailer i constitutes
an equilibrium strategy for b ≤ 0.67209:
• ˆ wN
i,j = ˆ wN
i , ˆ wN
i,−j = 0,
• ˆ TN
i,j = πi( ˆ wN
i , ˆ wN
−i) − ΠN(t = 0) + 1
2 (Πm
1 + Πm
2 ), ˆ T N
i,−j = 0,
• ˆ wE
i,j = ˆ wE
i,−j = c,
• ˆ TE
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2 − ΠN(t = 0)
￿
whether he accepts non-exclusive or exclusive con-
tracts. Hence a manufacturer accepts a non-exclusive contract if he can earn
at least this proﬁt. Retailer i’s proﬁt in case of non-exclusive contracts is
equal to ΠN(t = 0) − Πm
−i = ΠN(t = 0) −
(1−c)2
4 . This proﬁt is greater or
equal to zero for b ≤ 0.67209. Retailer i cannot gain from a deviation to
another non-exclusive contract since ˆ wN
i is a best response, and since the
manufacturers will not accept a contract that oﬀers them a lower proﬁt.
By construction, i’s proﬁt is weakly greater than the proﬁt he could earn






2 − ΠN(t = 0)
￿
= ΠN(t = 0) − Πm
−i.
Proof of Proposition 3
The nature of the contract and the number of active retailers in each case
come directly from Propositions 1 and 2. Consider then the price compar-
isons. Given exclusive contracts in autarky, the price is ￿ pE = c+ 1−c
2 . In free
trade, either the price does not change, or we obtain non-exclusive contracts
and the price is given by (8). In this case, prices are lower in free trade
because
￿ p
E − ￿ p
N
i =
(1 − c)(2 − b)b
2(4 − b(2 + b))
> 0.
With non-exclusive contracts in autarky, prices are given by (7). If there are








4[4 − b(2 + b)]
> 0.
Alternatively, contracts are exclusive in free trade and the price is ￿ pE =
c + 1−c
2 . In this case, the free-trade price is higher than in autarky since
￿ p
N





Proof of Proposition 4
Consider ﬁrst the case of exclusive contracts. In this case, there is one
active retailer so that consumer surplus is CS =
q2
i
2 , where i = 1,2 depending




8 , πi = ￿ π
E




4 . In free trade the
equilibrium with exclusive contracts implies CSE
FT = CSE
Aut, πi = ￿ π
E
i = 0.




4 since the home
28manufacturer earns half the monopoly rents on domestic sales (the other half
is earned by the foreign manufacturer) and the home manufacturer earns half
the monopoly rent generated abroad. Thus, domestic social welfare with an










Consider next the case of non-exclusive contracts where both retailers are
















(1 − c)2(6 − b)(2 + b)
16(1 + b)
.
In free trade, CSN
FT =
(2−b2)2(1−c)2
(1+b)(4−2b−b2)2. When both countries are in an equilib-
rium with non-exclusive contracts, then the rents accruing to the domestic
manufacturer and the two retailers are equal to ΠN =
4(1−b)(2−b2)(1−c)2
(1+b)(4−2b−b2)2 since
the share of the rent earned by the foreign manufacturer in the home coun-
try is equal to the share of the rent earned by the home manufacturer in
the foreign country. Hence when both countries are in an equilibrium with




(6 − 4b − b2)(2 − b2)(1 − c)2
(1 + b)(4 − 2b − b2)2 . (15)
Two additional cases may arise in free trade when 0.61803 < b ≤ 0.67209.
Speciﬁcally, one country may be in an equilibrium with exclusive contracts
while the other is in an equilibrium with non-exclusive contracts. These cases
are irrelevant for the proof since the welfare results for this range of b are
ambiguous even when these cases do not arise.
Now examine how welfare changes with a move from autarky to free trade.
(i) If b ≤ 0.61803 and contracts remain non-exclusive, it can be veriﬁed that
WN
FT − W N
Aut > 0. Alternatively, if there are exclusive contracts in autarky
29but non-exclusive contracts in free trade, we have W N
FT − W E
Aut > 0. (ii)
If 0.61803 < b ≤ 0.67209, it is straightforward to verify that: 1) domestic
welfare rises when, in both countries, contracts are non-exclusive in autarky
and in free trade since W N
FT − W N
Aut > 0; 2) welfare does not change when,
in both countries, there is exclusivity in autarky and in free trade, since
WE
FT − W E
Aut = 0; 3) welfare decreases when, in both countries, there are
non-exclusive contracts in autarky and exclusive contracts in free trade, since
WE
FT − W N
Aut < 0. (iii) If b > 0.67209, either welfare does not change as
WE
FT − W E
Aut = 0, or welfare decreases as W E
FT − WN
Aut < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
When trade liberalization is unilateral, the only diﬀerence with respect
to the proof of Proposition 4 concerns the free-trade level of welfare since
the domestic manufacturer does not earn any rents abroad. With non-
exclusive contracts in free trade, the rents accruing to the domestic man-
ufacturer and the two retailers are now equal to ΠN − πN












(1+b)(4−2b−b2)2 . Hence πN
f has to be sub-
tracted from W N
FT. We can show that WN
FT − πN
f − WN
Aut < 0 for all feasible
values of b and WN
FT − πN
f − W E
Aut > 0 for b < 0.67209. With exclusive
contracts in free trade, social welfare is equal to ˇ WE
FT =
(1−c)2
4 . As a result,
ˇ WE
FT − W E
Aut < 0 and ˇ WE
FT − W N
Aut < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which both retailers accept an ex-
clusive contract from manufacturer i = h,f, so that the other manufacturer,
−i, does not sell. The highest total industry proﬁt that can be generated is
then given by   πm (see 11), which is achieved when the active manufacturer
sets the wholesale price   wi = c + b(1 − c)/2 (see 9). Hence the highest pay-
ment that the active manufacturer can oﬀer each retailer for not buying from
30the rival manufacturer is   πm/2. Also note that an exclusive contract that
oﬀers both retailers strictly less than   πm/2 cannot occur in equilibrium, since
the inactive manufacturer would then have an incentive to oﬀer the retailers
an amount closer to   πm/2, thereby realizing a positive proﬁt.
Consider the joint proﬁt that manufacturer −i and a retailer could obtain
by breaking the exclusive contract when manufacturer i chooses wholesale
price   wi. This proﬁt is given by
π−i(   wi,w−i) = (w−i − c)
(2 − b − b2 − (2 − b2)w−i + b   wi)
(4 − b2)(1 − b2)
+
(2 − b − b2 − (2 − b2)w−i + b  wi)
2
(4 − b2)
2 (1 − b2)
.
The wholesale price that maximizes this joint proﬁt is given by
  w−i =
b2(4 − 2b − b2) + c(16 − 12b2 + 2b3 + b4)
8(2 − b2)
,
which is strictly less than   wi, and the resulting joint proﬁt is equal to:
π−i(   wi,   w−i) =
(1 − c)
2 (4 − 2b − b2)
2
32(2 − b2)(1 − b2)
.
This proﬁt is strictly greater than   πm/2, since
(1 − c)
2 (4 − 2b − b2)
2






2 (2 − b)
2 b2
32(2 − b2)(1 − b2)
> 0,
which implies that an exclusive contract cannot occur in equilibrium.
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